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Negligence
H E successful practice of accountancy
Tappears,
with increasing insistence, to

depend upon a knowledge of law. Business
relationships, and even routine transactions apparently with nothing more than
commonplace significance, frequently force
their way into prominence, because they
have their foundation in some legal instrument which confers on the parties at interest certain obligations as well as certain
privileges. The accountant with increasing
frequency finds himself under the necessity
of reading and interpreting long and involved documents, before he can review
intelligently financial transactions to which
his client has been a party.
The following case, of which the substance only is given, illustrates the extreme care with which legal documents
should be read, and the caution with which
performance under an agreement should be
verified. Fortunately, the case in question does not involve accountants in any
way, but it has a lesson from which they
may profit. It serves further to emphasize
the need, at times, under circumstances of
complicated legal situations, of obtaining
legal advice before rendering certified
statements without qualification.
The New York Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division of the New
York Supreme Court, and the Trial Term,
rendered, under date of May 6, 1930, a decision adverse to the defendants, in the
matter of John A. Doyle, appellant, v. The
Chatham and Phenix National Bank of the
City of New York, respondent.
(New
York Law Journal, May 23, 1930.)

The Bank was trustee under an indenture covering an issue of collateral trust
gold bonds. The Bank certified certain
bonds as being of the series covered by the
indenture. The plaintiff bought some of
these bonds. The bonds proved uncollectible. The plaintiff brought an action
against the Bank, alleging that the negligence of the Bank was the proximate cause
of his loss. The lower courts decided the
case in favor of the Bank. The Court of
Appeals reversed the lower courts and
granted a new trial.
The meat of the trouble is found in the
simple wording of the certificates printed
on the bonds, which were signed by the
Bank. The certificate read: "This bond
is one of the series of bonds described in the
Collateral Trust Indenture mentioned
therein." From this it appears that all of
the provisions of the trust indenture should
have been satisfied before the Bank could
be justified in signing any certificate.
The trust indenture provided, among
other things, that the collateral deposited
with the trustee should be equal to 110%
of the face of the bonds to be issued; that
the collateral should be trade acceptances
or notes of dealers guaranteed by Motor
Guaranty Corporation, cash or notes of
purchasers in part payment for motor
vehicles, or other first-lien mortgages, such
purchasers' notes being indorsed by dealers
and guaranteed by the Motor Guaranty
Corporation.
The Bank was authorized to authenticate bonds, that is, to sign the certificate in
question, without further inquiry and with
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full protection, upon receipt of the collateral described. The Bank also was authorized to accept certificates from officers of
the Company, accompanying schedules detailing the collateral as conclusive evidence
of the collateral, with full warrant and protection to it for any and all action taken on
the faith thereof under the terms of the
indenture.
The notes deposited with the trustee as
collateral, except in one instance and in a
minor amount, were not the certain notes
required under the trust indenture. They
were not notes of automobile dealers, nor
were they, with the one exception, notes
given in the purchase of automobiles. They
were notes of a lawyer, a bond salesman, a
ticket agent, a mining corporation, and a
construction company. Apparently, they
proved ultimately to be worthless.
The Bank did not avail itself of the privilege of obtaining from the officers of the
Company, a certificate covering pertinent data relating to the collateral.
In the face of the broad provisions of
the trust indenture, it might be difficult to
see how the Bank could incur any liability
by signing the certificates of authentication. But the Court of Appeals held that
inasmuch as the collateral deposited was
not the kind of collateral required by the
trust indenture, and that since the Bank
had failed to request and obtain a statement covering the collateral, the Bank was.
negligent and the false certificates were the
proximate cause of the losses sustained.
This conclusion was on the theory that the
immunity clauses were intended to protect
the Bank in the execution of certain powers
which it failed to exercise.
There are several points in the decision
which are of interest to accountants. The
first of these refers to the responsibility of
the certifier, for the sufficiency, legality,
and value of collateral. The Court said:
"We agree that the defendant cannot be
held as the guarantor of the sufficiency or
legality of the securities pledged with it, or
for negligence in not ascertaining that the
securities were worthless."
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Further, the Court said: "If the defendant had requested and obtained a statement from the appropriate officers of the
corporation, certifying to the 'pertinent
data regarding such collateral' possessed by
them, its authority, without further investigation, to execute the certificates could
not have been questioned."
Quoting from Rhinelander v. Farmers
Loan & Trust Co., viz.: "In executing that
acceptance the defendant created the relation of trustee and cestui que trust between it and the future bondholders," the
Court continued: "Notwithstanding these
expressions, it is obvious that a trustee in
wrongly certifying bonds to prospective
takers, in order that they may become
cestui que trust, cannot at that moment and
before the relationship is established, have
violated a trust duty owed to them. Manifestly this is true: 'There is no trust or
other relation between a trustee and a
stranger about to deal with a cestui que
trust'."
Impliedly, however, the immunity clauses
were intended to protect the Bank against
the world at large, inasmuch as it is a
characteristic of bonds that title to them,
like currency, passes by delivery, and all
obligations under or connected with them
accrue to the holders in due course.
By this token, it seems to follow that any
obligation of the Bank was an obligation
to any one who might become a holder of
the bonds. In the instant case it appears
that any holder, or any prospective purchaser, was entitled to rely on the certificate of the Bank. If he did so, and the
statement of the Bank was a misrepresentation of fact, and loss resulted, the
Bank is adjudged to have been liable for
the loss.
The reasoning of the Court on this point
is lucid in the extreme: "Clearly, if the
defendant, as trustee, had issued the certificates when no securities whatever had
been deposited with it, liability for the
damage done would have arisen. Equally
must this follow where, as in this case, the
securities deposited were not the securities
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specified in the trust indenture from which
alone the defendant derived its power to
certify. In not ascertaining that the securities deposited were not securities of
the character named in the indenture, the
defendant was guilty of negligence. In
certifying the bonds as issued pursuant to
the terms of the indenture, it was guilty of
negligently making a misrepresentation of
fact. The plaintiff and certain assignors
were induced by the certificates to invest
in the worthless bonds. If the certificates
had not been executed the bonds could not
have been issued, and no loss would have
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accrued. Therefore, the false certificates
were the proximate cause of the losses sustained."
Fortunately, for accountants, their reports and certificates are addressed to clients who are individuals in the broad sense.
If, by any chance, an accountant under
such circumstances should become liable
for negligence, the liability would run
to the client. The case cited illustrates
well the meticulous care and diligence
which an accountant must observe in
dealing with situations which have legal
aspects.

